Why Adjudicate? (ebook)

Argumento de Why Adjudicate? (ebook)

"The book provides a cogent and compelling domestic logic. . . . Davis' book, a solid contribution by one of today's leading trade scholars, is also valuable for directing greater attention to how members navigate the multilateral trade regime, which is as important as the judicial activism of its arbitration panels. The book's findings have implications not only for the future of WTO dispute settlement reform--less is better--but for the benefits of legalization more broadly."--Soo Yeon Kim, World Trade Review

Winner of the 2014 Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation
Winner of the 2013 International Law Best Book Award, International Law Section of the International Studies Association
Co-Winner of the 2013 Chadwick F. Alger Prize, International Studies Association

"Christina Davis provides fresh insight into the adjudication of trade disputes. She convincingly argues that governments routinely file such disputes as a response to domestic political pressure, and she furnishes an impressive array of empirical evidence to substantiate this claim. The result is a book that will make a significant contribution to research on the political economy of international trade."--Edward Mansfield, University of Pennsylvania

"Many scholars and professionals are focused on the question of the effectiveness of the WTO as a mechanism for resolution of trade disputes. This book offers particular insight into this question and also considers the implications for new entrants in the international trading system, such as China. Why Adjudicate? is an extremely insightful volume and a pleasure to read."--Merit E. Janow, Columbia University

"Why Adjudicate? makes an important set of arguments about the WTO, putting forth a novel theory of domestic politics to explain state behavior in the institution. This compelling book dovetails nicely with existing WTO studies in law, economics, and political science, yet moves beyond analyses of wins and losses."--Jon C. Pevehouse, University of Wisconsin-Madison, coauthor of While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers

"Christina L. Davis provides an insightful and careful analysis of the domestic underpinnings of international trade law litigation. Why Adjudicate? fills a real gap in the literature by examining the factors that both shape and determine when states pursue legal challenges before the World Trade Organization's dispute-settlement mechanism. . . . Focusing on the United States and Japan as her primary case studies, she has completed an exceptional and valuable study that will be read by both scholars and professionals for years to come."--Jacqueline Krikorian, Perspectives on Politics

"Why Adjudicate is a must-read for any scholar interested in legalization of world politics, the role of international courts and the mechanisms of trade policy. I am sure this book will inspire these research programs and the field of International Political Economy for years to come."--Manfred Elsig, Review of International Organizations0List of Figures ix
List of Tables x
Acknowledgments xi
List of Abbreviations xv

Chapter 1:.Introduction 1
The Enforcement of International Trade Law 6
Overview 20

Chapter 2: Domestic Constraints and Active Enforcement 26
Trade Institutions and Liberalization 29
Political Origins of Demand for Trade Enforcement 39
Hypotheses for Trade Strategies 57
Conclusion 60

Chapter 3. The Democratic Propensity for Adjudication 62
Why Are Democracies Litigious? 66
Data 72
Democratic Challengers 80
Democratic Defendants 88
Alliances and Dyadic Dispute Patterns 92
Conclusion 100

Chapter 4:The Litigious State: U.S. Trade Policy 102
U.S. Role as Enforcer of Multilateral Trade Rules 104
Legislative Constraints in U.S. Trade Policy 111
The Kodak-Fuji Film Dispute 118
Foreign Trade Barrier Dataset 123
Statistical Analysis of U.S. Forum Choice 132
Boeing-Airbus Dispute 138
The China Problem 158
Conclusion 182

Chapter 5: The Reluctant Litigant: Japanese Trade Policy 185
Defending Market Access for Japanese Exports 187
Delegation in Japanese Trade Policy 195
Statistical Analysis of Japanese Forum Choice 210
Active Adjudication Targeting U.S. Steel Protection 225
Other Solutions for China 233
Conclusion 241

Chapter 6: Conflict Management: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Adjudication 244
Solving Hard Cases 246
Analysis of Progress to Remove Barrier 248
Analysis of Trade Dispute Duration 253
Conclusion 256

Chapter 7: Level Playing Field? Adjudication by Developing Countries 258
Peru Challenges European Food Labeling 262
Vietnam and the Catfish Dispute 267
Conclusion 279

Chapter 8: Conclusion 281
The Political Role of Adjudication 281
Conflict and Cooperation 293
Toward a Broader Theory of Legalization 297
Bibliography 301
Index 319