"This book is an achievement in terms of the application of formal models and the collection of new data."--Erik Jones, Survival
"[T]his is a smart, sophisticated analysis that contains much to admire. There can be no doubt that Reforming the European Union is a great book that all students of treaty revisions in the EU will have to read and engage with."--Mareike Kleine, Review of International Organisation
"[T]his is an excellent book for students of EU politics, particularly for those who want to understand EU Treaty change. The book would also be useful for students of political science in general concerning its up to date methods, which can also be rigorously applied in certain domestic settings."--Senem Aydin-Duzgit, Insight Turkey
"This theoretically rich and empirically driven study by Finke, Konig, Proksch, and Tseblis continues the scholarly discussion on the institutional reforms within the EU."--Choice
"Using an impressive range of sources, methods, and data, this work is a remarkable, detailed, and comprehensive description and analysis of the complex process of European reform."--Gary Marks, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
"European Union treaties set the power relationships among actors and establish the standards that the Union will enjoy in the future, so their design is as important as many of the world's constitutions. This book convincingly describes and explains how the Treaty of Lisbon came into force despite what seemed at the time like an endless series of negotiations, perceived dead ends, and failed referenda. It is easily the best book on the making of Europe--and European treaties--in quite a long time."--Mark Hallerberg, Hertie School of Governance
"Through theoretical and analytical interpretation of an extraordinary collection of original data, this book addresses the important and complicated process of treaty reform in the European Union. Novel and exemplary, it explores constitutional reform, the art of political manipulation, and the empirical study of bargaining. A major achievement."--Matthew Gabel, Washington University in St. Louis
"This excellent book will command a wide audience in EU politics, comparative politics, and international relations. The book's theoretical ideas, derived from rational choice institutionalism, are at the cutting edge of modern political science, its empirical methods are highly innovative, and the normative implications about the future of the European Union are significant."--Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science List of Tables xiii Acknowledgments xv Introduction 1 Chapter One: From the European Convention to the Lisbon Agreement and Beyond: A Veto Player Analysis Chapter Two: Revealing Constitutional Preferences in the European Convention Chapter Three: The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention Chapter Four: Actors and Positions on the Reform of the Treaty of Nice Chapter Five: Why (Unpopular) Leaders Announce Popular Votes Chapter Six: Principals and Agents: From the Convention's Proposal to the Constitutional Treaty Chapter Seven: In the Aftermath of the Negative Referendums: The Irish Resistance Appendix: Research Design and Methodology References 209 Index 221
By George Tsebelis 28
1.1 Judges, Bureaucrats, and the Democratic Deficit 32
1.2 Veto Players and Their Policy and Institutional Implications 38
1.3 A Qualified Majority in the Council: To What Extent Does It Impede
Decision Making? 45
1.4 Battles over the "Default Solution" 54
1.5 Conclusion 60
By Sven-OliverProksch 62
2.1 Revealing Preferences: Cosponsorship of Amendments in the European
Convention 64
2.2 Data and Method 68
2.3 Results: Giscard's Central Position within the Conflict Space 70
2.4 Conclusion 75
By George Tsebelis and Sven-Oliver Proksch 76
3.1 Limiting the Number of Amendments 78
3.2 Shaping Amendments 88
3.3 The Absence of Voting 94
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion 95
Appendix 3A 97
Appendix 3B 99
By Thomas König and Daniel Finke 103
4.1 The Process of Reform: From the Convention to the Ratification Stage 107
4.2 The Two-dimensional Space and the Location of the Political Leaders' Positions 111
4.3 Other Actors and the Cohesiveness of the Political Leaders' Positions 116
4.4 Representing and Delegating the Position of Political Leaders 120
4.5 The Ratifiers: Median Voters and Political Parties 125
4.6 Summary 127
By Thomas König and Daniel Finke 129
5.1 Political Leaders and Their Announcements of Referendums 132
5.2 Ratification Hurdles in Each Country 134
5.3 Decisions along the Ratification Path: A Strategic Consideration 137
5.4 The Empirical Analysis of Referendum Announcements 142
5.5 From Announcing Referendums to a Reflection Period and Reform Crisis 147
By Thomas König and Daniel Finke 151
6.1 The Setup for Intergovernmental Bargaining 154
6.2 The Reaction to Failure: Delegating the Negotiation Mandate 158
6.3 How Drifting Agents Enabled a Disagreeable Compromise 160
6.4 From Compromising Agents to the Defeat by the Vote of the Irish 166
By Thomas König and Daniel Finke 170
7.1 The Strategy of the German Presidency 173
7.2 Moderate but Well-directed Concessions 177
7.3 From Treaty Reform to Constitution Building, and Back 184
Conclusion 188
By Thomas König and Sven-Oliver Proksch 199