The Populist Paradox (ebook)

Argumento de The Populist Paradox (ebook)

Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence.

Gerber bases her findings on extensive surveys of the activities and motivations of interest groups and on close examination of campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns in eight states. Her research confirms what such wealthy interests as the insurance industry, trial lawyer associations, and tobacco companies have learned by defeats at the ballot box: if citizens do not like a proposed new law, even an expensive, high-profile campaign will not make them change their mind. She demonstrates, however, that these economic interest groups have considerable success in using direct legislation to block initiatives that others are proposing and to exert pressure on politicians. By contrast, citizen interest groups with broad-based support and significant organizational resources have proven to be extremely effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws. Clearly written and argued, this is a major theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of the role of citizens and organized interests in the American legislative process.

"Gerber's key finding--that citizen interest groups are more effective in using the initiative to alter the status quo, and that economic groups are more effective at preserving it--is an important amendment to the popular perception that interest groups now control the initiative process."--Bruce E. Cain, University of California, Berkeley

"The questions raised in The Populist Paradox are fundamental to our understanding of elections and representation and to the roles of citizens, organized interests, and elected officials. The book is well written and extremely well organized."--Frank R. Baumgartner, Pennsylvania State University0List of Figures
List of Tables xi
Acknowledgments xiii
1. What Is the Populist Paradox? 3
A Theory of Interest Group Influence 6
Motivation: The Study of Interest Group Influence 10
Justification: Why Study Direct Legislation? 15
Plan of the Book 19
2. Interest Group Choice 21
Forms of Influence 21
Interest Group Choice 27
Achieving Influence 30
Summary and Conclusions 36
3. Direct Legislation Hurdles 37
Achieving Direct Modifying Influence 38
Achieving Direct Preserving Influence
Achieving Indirect Modifying Influence 50
Achieving Indirect Preserving Influence: Opposing an Initiative to Signal the Legislature 52
Behavioral Hurdles 52
Summary and Conclusions 58
4. Group Characteristics and Resources 59
Monetary and Personnel Resources 59
Using Resources to Overcome Hurdles 60
Membership Characteristics 65
Classifying Groups and Their Resources 69
Hypotheses about Motivations and Forms of Influence 71
Summary 75
5. Motivations and Strategies 76
Methodology 76
What Do Groups Say They Do? 80
What Do Groups Actually Do? 93
Summary and Conclusions 100
6.Direct Policy Consequences 101
Direct Policy Consequences 101
Summary and Conclusions 119
7. Indirect Policy Consequences 121
State Policy Differences 122
Summary and Conclusions 136
8.The Populist Paradox: Reality Or Illusion? 137
Economic Group Limitations 137
Citizen Group Dominance 140
Implications for the Study of Direct Legislation 140
Implications for the Study Of Interest Group Influence 141
Positive versus Normative Implications 142
A Final Assessment 146
Appendixes 147
A. Direct Legislation Institutions 147
B. Survey Of Organizations 152
References 159
Index 165