The Federalist Papers (ebook)

Argumento de The Federalist Papers (ebook)

The Federalist, by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, constitutes a text central to the American political tradition. Published in newspapers in 1787 and 1788 to explain and promote ratification of the proposed Constitution for the United States, which up to then were bound by the Articles of Confederation, The Federalist remains today of singular importance to students of liberty around the world.

The new Liberty Fund edition presents the text of the Gideon edition of The Federalist, published in 1818, which includes the preface to the text by Jacob Gideon as well as the responses and corrections prepared by Madison to the McLean edition of 1810. The McLean edition had presented the Federalist texts as corrected by Hamilton and Jay but not reviewed by Madison.

The Liberty Fund Federalist also includes a new introduction, a Readers Guide outlining—section by section—the arguments of The Federalist, a glossary, and ten appendixes, including the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia Resolution Proposing the Annapolis Convention, and other key documents leading up to the transmission of the Constitution to the governors of the several states. Finally, the Constitution of the United States and Amendments is given, with marginal cross-references to the pertinent passages in The Federalist that address, argue for, or comment upon the specific term, phrase, section, or article of the Constitution.

Alexander Hamilton (17551804) was secretary and aide-de-camp to Washington in 177781, a member of the Continental Congress in 178283 and 178788, a representative from New York to the Annapolis Convention in 1786 and to the Constitutional Convention in 1787, first U. S. secretary of the treasury in 178995, and inspector general of the army, with the rank of major general, from 1798 to 1800. His efforts to defeat Aaron Burr for the presidency in 1800-01 and for the governorship of New York in 1804 led to his fatal duel with Burr.

John Jay (17451829) was a member of the Continental Congress in 1774 through 1779 and its president in 177879, drafter of New Yorks first constitution in 1777, chief justice of the New York supreme court from 1777 to 1778, U. S. minister to Spain in 1779, a member of the commission to negotiate peace with Great Britain in Paris in 1787, U. S. secretary of foreign affairs from 1784 to 1789, Chief Justice of the United States from 1789 to 1795, and governor of New York from 1795 to 1801.

James Madison (17511836) was a member of the Virginia legislature in 177680 and 178486, of the Continental Congress in 178083, and of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, where he earned the title father of the U. S. Constitution. He was a member of the U. S. House of Representatives from 1789 to 1797, where he was a sponsor of the Bill of Rights and an opponent of Hamiltons financial measures. He was the author of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 in opposition to the U. S. alien and sedition laws. He was U. S. secretary of state in 180109, President of the U. S. in 180917, and rector of the University of Virginia, 182636.

George W. Carey is a professor of government at Georgetown University and the editor of several works on American government. He is the author of In Defense of the Constitution, published by Liberty Fund.

James McClellan (1937-2005) was James Bryce Visiting Fellow in American Studies at the Institute of United States Studies, University of London, and the author of Liberty, Order, and Justic0Editors ’ Introduction xvii Reader ’s Guide to The Federalist lvii Preface to the Gideon Edition lxxxv The Federalist No.1 Introduction 1
No.2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force & Influence 5
No.3 The same Subject continued 9
No.4 The same Subject continued 13
No.5 The same Subject continued 17
No.6 Concerning Dangers from War between the States 20
No.7 The subject continued, and Particular Causes Enumerated 26
No.8 The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions unfriendly to liberty 32
No.9 The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection 37
No.10 The same Subject continued 42
No.11 The Utility of the Union in respect to Commerce and a Navy 49
No.12 The Utility of the Union in respect to Revenue 55
No.13 The same Subject continued, with a view to Economy 60
No.14 An Objection drawn from the Extent of Country, Answered 62
No.15 Concerning the Defects of the Present Confederation, in Relation to the Principle of Legislation for the States in their Collective
Capacities 68
No.16 The same Subject continued, in relation to the same Principles 75
No.17 The Subject continued, and Illustrated by Examples, to show the tendency of Federal Governments, rather to Anarchy among the
Members, than Tyranny in the Head 80
No.18 The Subject continued, with further Examples 84
No.19 The Subject continued, with further Examples 90
No.20 The Subject continued, with further Examples 95
No.21 Further defects of the present Constitution 99
No.22 The same subject continued, and concluded 104
No.23 The necessity of a government, at least equally energetic with the one proposed 112
No.24 The subject continued, with an answer to an objection concerning standing armies 117
No.25 The subject continued, with the same view 122
No.26 The subject continued, with the same view 126
No.27 The subject continued, with the same view 132
No.28 The same subject continued 136
No.29 Concerning the militia 140
No.30 Concerning taxation 145
No.31 The same subject continued 150
No.32 The same subject continued 154
No.33 The same subject continued 158
No.34 The same subject continued 162
No.35 The same subject continued 167
No.36 The same subject continued 172
No.37 Concerning the difficulties which the convention must have experienced in the formation of a proper plan 179
No.38 The subject continued, and the incoherence of the objections to the plan, exposed 186
No.39 The conformity of the plan to republican principles: an objection in respect to the powers of the convention, examined 193
No.40 The same objection further examined 199
No.41 General view of the powers proposed to be vested in the union 207
No.42 The same view continued 215
No.43 The same view continued 222
No.44 The same view continued and concluded 230
No.45 A further discussion of the supposed danger from the powers of the union, to the state governments 237
No.46 The subject of the last paper resumed; with an examination of the comparative means of influence of the federal and state governments
242
No.47 The meaning of the maxim, which requires a separation of the departments of power, examined and ascertained 249
No.48 The same subject continued, with a view to the means of giving efficacy in practice to that maxim 256
No.49 The same subject continued, with the same view 260
No.50 The same subject continued, with the same view 264
No.51 The same subject continued, with the same view, and concluded 267
No.52 Concerning the house of representatives, with a view to the qualifications of the electors and elected, and the time of service of the
members 272
No.53 The same subject continued, with a view of the term of service of the members 276
No.54 The same subject continued, with a view to the ratio of representation 282
No.55 The same subject continued, in relation to the total number of the body 286
No.56 The subject continued, in relation to the same point 291
No.57 The same subject continued, in relation to the supposed tendency of the plan of the convention to elevate the few above the many 295
No.58 The same subject continued, in relation to the future augmentation of the members 300
No.59 Concerning the regulation of elections 305
No.60 The same subject continued 310
No.61 The same subject continued, and concluded 315
No.62 Concerning the constitution of the senate, with regard to the qualifications of the members; the manner of appointing them; the equality
of representation; the number of the senators, and the duration of their appointments 319
No.63 A further view of the constitution of the senate, in regard to the duration of the appointment of its members 325
No.64 A further view of the constitution of the senate, in regard to the power of making treaties 332
No.65 A further view of the constitution of the senate, in relation to its capacity, as a court for the trial of impeachments 337
No.66 The same subject continued 342
No.67 Concerning the constitution of the president: a gross attempt to misrepresent this part of the plan detected 347
No.68 The view of the constitution of the president continued, in relation to the mode of appointment 351
No.69 The same view continued, with a comparison between the president and the king of Great Britain, on the one hand, and the governor of
New York, on the other 355
No.70 The same view continued, in relation to the unity of the executive, and with an examination of the project of an executive council 362
No.71 The same view continued, in regard to the duration of the office 369
No.72 The same view continued, in regard to the re-eligibility of the president 374
No.73 The same view continued, in relation to the provision concerning support, and the power of the negative 379
No.74 The same view continued, in relation to the command of the national forces, and the power of pardoning 384
No.75 The same view continued, in relation to the power of making treaties 387
No.76 The same view continued, in relation to the appointment of the officers of the government 391
No.77 The view of the constitution oft he president concluded, with a further consideration of the power of appointment, and a concise
examination of his remaining powers 396
No.78 A view of the constitution of the judicial department in relation to the tenure of good behaviour 401
No.79 A further view of the judicial department, in relation to the provisions for the support and responsibility of the judges 408
No.80 A further view of the judicial department, in relation to the extent of its powers 411
No.81 A further view of the judicial department, in relation to the distribution of its authority 417
No.82 A further view of the judicial department, in reference to some miscellaneous questions 426
No.83 A further view of the judicial department, in relation to the trial by jury 430
No.84 Concerning several miscellaneous objections 442
No.85 Conclusion 452 Glossary 459
Appendixes
1.The Declaration of Independence 495
2.Articles of Confederation 500
3.Virginia Resolution Proposing the Annapolis Convention 510
4.Proceedings of the Annapolis Convention 511
5.Virginia Resolution Providing Delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 516
6.Call by the Continental Congress for the Federal Convention of 1787 518
7.Resolution of the Federal Convention Submitting the Constitution to the Continental Congress 520
8.Washington ’s Letter of Transmittal to the President of the Continental Congress 522
9.Resolution of the Continental Congress Submitting the Constitution to the Several States 524
10.Letter of the Secretary of the Continental Congress Transmitting Copy of the Constitution to the Several Governors 525
The Constitution of the United States (cross-referenced with The Federalist )and Amendments 526 Index 553