Reputation and International Cooperation (ebook)

Argumento de Reputation and International Cooperation (ebook)

"In an extraordinarily well-researched and very interesting book on the not so interesting subject of sovereign debt, Michael Tomz shows that contrary to popular belief and several dominant theories, states do now and have always cared about their international financial reputations."--Anastasia Xenias, Political Science Quarterly

"In Reputation and International Cooperation, Michael Tomz uses the experience of international lending over four centuries to assess the sources of international conflict and cooperation. Tomz argues that debtors collaborate with creditors because they are concerned about their reputations, refuting a host of widely accepted explanations for why sovereign debtors pay their debts. He marshals a wealth of evidence, ranging over time from eighteenth-century Amsterdam to the present, and using everything from bond yields through data on military disputes to current interviews. The result is a remarkably thorough, concise, and convincing analysis of the political economy of international debt with profound implications for the study of international politics more generally."--Jeffry Frieden, Harvard University

"Based on meticulous research from a wide variety of sources, Tomz's book clearly establishes the importance of a state's previous behavior and its resulting reputation for the rate of interest it must pay when it next enters the international financial market. Carefully conceived and ingeniously executed, this study is a real model."--Robert Jervis, author of System Effects and Perception and Misperception in International Politics

"This book is a gem. I cannot think of a better book on political economy and economic history. In all important categories, the book makes major contributions. Tomz's argument is original and logically compelling, and it produces unique, testable implications. His data represent years of painstaking research and stand as an almost impossible achievement."--J. Lawrence Broz, University of California, San Diego

"No other work in international relations is more impressive in its systematic use of so many kinds of evidence--archival, available quantitative data, case studies--to test such a clear set of alternative hypotheses. Michael Tomz has produced a pathbreaking study."--Robert Keohane, Princeton University

"Tomz has gathered a large amount of quantitative and qualitative historical evidence from archives and libraries in nine countries. International historians can benefit both from reading his case studies and from thinking about the role of market forces in international relations in the light of his theory on sovereign debt."--G.C. Peden, The International History Review

Winner of the 2008 Giovanni Sartori Award, for the Best Book Developing or Applying Qualitative Methods Published in 20070List of Tables ix
List of Figures xi
Preface xiii

PART ONE: THEORY 1
Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt 3
Chapter 2: A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation 14

PART TWO: EVIDENCE 37
Chapter 3: Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers 39
Chapter 4: Reputation in Expert Opinion 70
Chapter 5: Reputations during Good Times and Bad 86
Chapter 6: Enforcement by Gunboats 114
Chapter 7: Enforcement through Trade Sanctions 158
Chapter 8: Enforcement through Collective Retaliation 196

PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS 221
Chapter 9: Reputation and Cooperation under Anarchy 223
Bibliography 243
Index 275