Preface xiiiChapter One. Choice, Preference, and Utility 1
- 1.1. Consumer Choice: The Basics 1
- 1.2. Proving Most of Proposition 1.2, and More 5
- 1.3. The No-Better-Than Sets and Utility Representations 7
- 1.4. Strict Preference and Indifference 9
- 1.5. Infinite Sets and Utility Representations 10
- 1.6. Choice from Infinite Sets 15
- 1.7. Equivalent Utility Representations 17
- 1.8. Commentary 18
- Bibliographic Notes 23
- Problems 23
Chapter Two. Structural Properties of Preferences and Utility Functions 30
- 2.1. Monotonicity 31
- 2.2. Convexity 32
- 2.3. Continuity 35
- 2.4. Indifference Curve Diagrams 38
- 2.5. Weak and Additive Separability 39
- 2.6. Quasi-linearity 43
- 2.7. Homotheticity 44
- Bibliographic Notes 45
- Problems 45
Chapter Three. Basics of Consumer Demand 50
- 3.1. The Consumer's Problem 50
- 3.2. Basic Facts about the CP 52
- 3.3. The Marshallian Demand Correspondence and Indirect Utility Function 54
- 3.4. Solving the CP with Calculus 56
- Bibliographic Notes 63
- Problems 64
Chapter Four. Revealed Preference and Afriat's Theorem 67
- 4.1. An Example and Basic Ideas 67
- 4.2. GARP and Afriat's Theorem 70
- 4.3. Comparative Statics and the Own-Price Effect 74
- Bibliographic Notes 77
- Problems 78
Chapter Five. Choice under Uncertainty 79
- 5.1. Two Models and Three Representations 79
- 5.2. The Mixture-Space Theorem 89
- 5.3. States of Nature and Subjective Expected Utility 101
- 5.4. Subjective and Objective Probability and the Harsanyi Doctrine 108
- 5.5. Empirical and Theoretical Critiques 110
- Bibliographic Notes 116
- Problems 116
Chapter Six. Utility for Money 123
- 6.1. Properties of Utility Functions for Money 123
- 6.2. Induced Preferences for Income 134
- 6.3. Demand for Insurance and Risky Assets 138
- Bibliographic Notes 140
- Problems 140
Chapter Seven. Dynamic Choice 148
- 7.1. The Standard Strategic Approach 149
- 7.2. Dynamic Programming 152
- 7.3. Testable Restrictions of the Standard Model 153
- 7.4. Three Alternatives to the Standard Model 156
- Bibliographic Notes 161
- Problems 161
Chapter Eight. Social Choice and Efficiency 166
- 8.1. Arrow's Theorem 166
- 8.2. What Do We Give Up? 172
- 8.3. Efficiency 175
- 8.4. Identifying the Pareto Frontier: Utility Imputations and Bergsonian Social Utility Functionals 176
- 8.5. Syndicate Theory and Efficient Risk Sharing: Applying Proposition 8.10 184
- 8.6. Efficiency? 192
- Bibliographic Notes 194
- Problems 194
Chapter Nine. Competitive and Profit-Maximizing Firms 197
- 9.1. The Production-Possibility Set 198
- 9.2. Profit Maximization 199
- 9.3. Basics of the Firm's Profit-Maximization Problem 201
- 9.4. Afriat's Theorem for Firms 207
- 9.5. From Profit Functions to Production-Possibility Sets 211
- 9.6. How Many Production-Possibility Sets Give the Same Profit Function? 213
- 9.7. What Is Going On Here, Mathematically? 216
- 9.8. Differentiability of the Profit Function 219
- 9.9. Cost Minimization and Input-Requirement Sets 222
- 9.10. Why DoWe Care? 228
- Bibilographic Notes 229
- Problems 229
Chapter Ten. The Expenditure-Minimization Problem 233
- 10.1. Defining the EMP 233
- 10.2. Basic Analysis of the EMP 235
- 10.3. Hicksian Demand and the Expenditure Function 236
- 10.4. Properties of the Expenditure Function 238
- 10.5. How Many Continuous Utility Functions
- Give the Same Expenditure Function? 240
- 10.6. Recovering Continuous Utility Functions from Expenditure Functions 247
- 10.7. Is an Alleged Expenditure Function Really an Expenditure Function? 248
- 10.8. Connecting the CP and the EMP 254
- Bibliographic Notes 255
- Problems 255
Chapter Eleven. Classic Demand Theory 258
- 11.1. Roy's Identity and the Slutsky Equation 258
- 11.2. Differentiability of Indirect Utility 262
- 11.3. Duality of Utility and Indirect Utility 269
- 11.4. Differentiability of Marshallian Demand 274
- 11.5. Integrability 279
- 11.6. Complements and Substitutes 283
- 11.7. Integrability and Revealed Preference 284
- Bibliographic Notes 286
- Problems 287
Chapter Twelve. Producer and Consumer Surplus 289
- 12.1. Producer Surplus 289
- 12.2. Consumer Surplus 296
- Bibliographic Notes 304
- Problems 304
Chapter Thirteen. Aggregating Firms and Consumers 306
- 13.1. Aggregating Firms 307
- 13.2. Aggregating Consumers 310
- 13.3. Convexification through Aggregation 318
- Bibliographic Notes 326
- Problems 326
Chapter Fourteen. General Equilibrium 329
- 14.1. Definitions 329
- 14.2. Basic Properties ofWalrasian Equilibrium 333
- 14.3. The Edgeworth Box 335
- 14.4. Existence ofWalrasian Equilibria 338
- 14.5. The Set of Equilibria for a Fixed Economy 351
- 14.6. The Equilibrium Correspondence 354
- Bibliographic Notes 354
- Problems 355
Chapter Fifteen. General Equilibrium, Efficiency, and the Core 358
- 15.1. The First Theorem ofWelfare Economics 359
- 15.2. The Second Theorem ofWelfare Economics 362
- 15.3. Walrasian Equilibria Are in the Core 366
- 15.4. In a Large Enough Economy, Every Core Allocation Is a Walrasian-Equilibrium Allocation 370
- 15.5. Externalities and Lindahl Equilibrium 380
- Bibliographic Notes 383
- Problems 383
Chapter Sixteen. General Equilibrium, Time, and Uncertainty 386
- 16.1. A Framework for Time and Uncertainty 386
- 16.2. General Equilibrium with Time and Uncertainty 389
- 16.3. Equilibria of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations: I. Pure Exchange with Contingent Claims 392
- 16.4. EPPPE: II. Complex Financial Securities and Complete Markets 402
- 16.5. EPPPE: III. Complex Securities with Real Dividends and Complete Markets 418
- 16.6. Incomplete Markets 419
- 16.7. Firms 424
- Bibliographic Notes 431
- Problems 432
About the Appendices 437
Appendix One: Mathematical Induction 439
Appendix Two: Some Simple Real Analysis 441
- A2.1. The Setting 441
- A2.2. Distance, Neighborhoods, and Open and Closed Sets 441
- A2.3. Sequences and Limits 445
- A2.4. Boundedness, (Completeness), and Compactness 446
- A2.5. Continuous Functions 447
- A2.6. Simply Connected Sets and the Intermediate-Value Theorem 448
- A2.7. Suprema and Infima; Maxes and Mins 448
- A2.8. The Maximum of a Continuous Function on a Compact Set 449
- A2.9. Lims Sup and Inf 450
- A2.10. Upper and Lower Semi-continuous Functions 451
Appendix Three: Convexity 452
- A3.1. Convex Sets 452
- A3.2. The Separating- and Supporting-Hyperplane Theorems 457
- A3.3. The Support-Function Theorem 459
- A3.4. Concave and Convex Functions 461
- A3.5. Quasi-concavity and Quasi-convexity 463
- A3.6. Supergradients and Subgradients 466
- A3.7. Concave and Convex Functions and Calculus 468
Appendix Four: Correspondences 469
- A4.1. Functions and Correspondences 470
- A4.2. Continuity of Correspondences 471
- A4.3. Singleton-Valued Correspondences and Continuity 474
- A4.4. Parametric Constrained Optimization Problems and Berge's Theorem 475
- A4.5. Why this Terminology? 477
Appendix Five: Constrained Optimization 479
Appendix Six: Dynamic Programming 485
- A6.1. Several Examples 485
- A6.2. A General Formulation 489
- A6.3. Bellman's Equation 494
- A6.4. Conserving and Unimprovable Strategies 496
- A6.5. Additive Rewards 501
- A6.6. States of the System 504
- A6.7. Solving Finite-Horizon Problems 506
- A6.8. Infinite-Horizon Problems and Stationarity 509
- A6.9. Solving Infinite-Horizon (Stationary) Problems with Unimprovability 512
- A6.10. Policy Iteration (and Transience) 516
- A6.11. Value Iteration 518
- A6.12. Examples 521
- A6.13. Things Not Covered Here: Other Optimality Criteria; Continuous Time and Control Theory 527
- A6.14. Multi-armed Bandits and Complexity 528
- A6.15. Four More Problems You Can Solve 530
Appendix Seven: The Implicit Function Theorem 534
Appendix Eight: Fixed-Point Theory 535
References 543
Index 551