Locke on Personal Identity (ebook)

Argumento de Locke on Personal Identity (ebook)

John Locke’s theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In this book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke’s critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point.

Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke’s use of the word "person" as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word "conscious." When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner.

Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.

"[E]legant and provocative. . . . There is no denying that the case he makes in this short but compelling book is a powerful one."--Barry Dainton, Times Literary Supplement

"This book will appeal to Locke scholars and those interested in Locke's account of personal identity."--Choice0Preface xi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 "Person" 5
Chapter 3 "Person . . . is a forensic term" 17
Chapter 4 Concernment 22
Chapter 5 Consciousness 30
Chapter 6 "Consciousness . . . is inseparable from thinking "42
Chapter 7 "From the inside" 50
Chapter 8 "Person"--Locke's Definition 58
Chapter 9 Consciousness Is Not Memory 72
Chapter 10 Personal Identity 77
Chapter 11 Psychological Connectedness 88
Chapter 12 Transition (Butler Dismissed) 93
Chapter 13 "But next . . . ": Personal Identity without Substantial Continuity 97
Chapter 14 "And therefore . . . ": [I]-transfers, [Ag]-transfers, [P]-transfers 110
Chapter 15 "A fatal error of theirs" 119
Chapter 16 A Fatal Error of Locke's? 125
Chapter 17 Circularity? 131
Chapter 18 The Distinction between [P] and [S] 135
Chapter 19 Concernment and Repentance 139
Chapter 20 Conclusion 150
Postface 157
Appendix 1 "Of Identity and Diversity" by John Locke 163
Appendix 2 A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion Concerning Personal Identity by Edmund Law 233
References 253
Index 259