In this book, Ernest Sosa explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by him years ago, known as virtue epistemology. Here he provides the first comprehensive account of his views on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily first-order skill or competence but rather the reflective good judgment required for proper risk assessment. Sosa develops this bi-level account in multiple ways, by applying it to issues much disputed in recent epistemology: epistemic agency, how knowledge is normatively related to action, the knowledge norm of assertion, and the Meno problem as to how knowledge exceeds merely true belief. A full chapter is devoted to how experience should be understood if it is to figure in the epistemic competence that must be manifest in the truth of any belief apt enough to constitute knowledge. Another takes up the epistemology of testimony from the performance-theoretic perspective. Two other chapters are dedicated to comparisons with ostensibly rival views, such as classical internalist foundationalism, a knowledge-first view, and attributor contextualism. The book concludes with a defense of the epistemic circularity inherent in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well.
"Sosa's work has been at the center of many of these debates. Knowing Full Well is the latest and most sophisticated and mature statement of his views on several of the relevant topics. It is a must-read for anyone with an interest in normative epistemology."--Jason Baehr, Mind
"This brilliant book develops and defends the highly influential virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge its author originated three decades ago. An obvious 'must read' for students of contemporary epistemology, the book's breadth and clarity combined with the author's disciplinary stature will make it appealing to a wide range of theorists working outside epistemology, including philosophers of mind and action."--E.J. Coffman, Philosophical Review
Acknowledgments ix
Chapter One: Knowing Full Well 1
Chapter Two: Epistemic Agency 14
Chapter Three: Value Matters in Epistemology 35
Chapter Four: Three Views of Human Knowledge 67
Chapter Five: Contextualism 96
Chapter Six: Propositional Experience 108
Chapter Seven: Knowledge: Instrumental and Testimonial 128
Chapter Eight: Epistemic Circularity 140
Summing Up 159
Index 161