Deterrence by Diplomacy (ebook)

Argumento de Deterrence by Diplomacy (ebook)

Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements. Deterrence by Diplomacy challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic.

Anne Sartori argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable. States take pains to use diplomacy honestly most of the time because doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which in turn enhance their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force. So, to maintain the effectiveness of their diplomacy, states sometimes acquiesce to others' demands when they might have been able to attain their goals through bluffs. Sartori theorizes that countries obtain a "trade" of issues over time; they get their way more often when they deem the issues more important, and concede more often when they deem the issues less important. Departing from traditional theory, this book shows that rather than always fighting over small issues to show resolve, states can make their threats more credible by sometimes honestly acquiescing over lesser issues--by not crying "wolf."

"Deterrence by Diplomacy brings together several key issues in international politics--credibility, crisis bargaining, reputations, the interconnectedness of commitments, costly signaling, and diplomacy. It connects several important ideas in international politics and contributes to their development."--Robert Powell, University of California, Berkeley, author of In the Shadow of Power

"This well-written book is a pleasure to read, and I learned a great deal from it. Sartori presents complex ideas in an accessible manner, and provides a compelling example of both the use of formal models in analyzing complex problems and the sophisticated use of statistical methods."--R. Harrison Wagner, University of Texas at Austin

"[This book] offers a concise, tightly argued analysis, with a clear theoretical position tested via elegant and creative research."--Patrick Morgan, Perspectives on Politics0Preface ix

Part I: Introduction 1

Chapter 1: Introduction 3
Three Misconceptions About Diplomacy 6
How Can a State Communicate That an Adversary Has Misjudged Its Resolve? 12
Overview of the Book 14

Part II: How Bluffs Can Hurt a State's Diplomacy, and Honesty Provides the Ability to Communicate 17

Chapter 2: The Failure of Chinese Diplomacy, 1950 19
The Chinese Attempt at Deterrence 22
The U.S. Dismissal of China's Threats as Bluffs 26
Would the United States and China Have Fought if China's Threats Had Been Credible? 30
Why Did the United States Dismiss China's Threats As Bluffs? 32
Conclusion 41
Chapter 3 A Reputational Theory of Diplomacy 43
Reputations for Honesty and Reputations for Resolve 44
Audience Costs, Cheap Talk, and Diplomacy 49
The Game-Theoretic Model 52
Effective, Cheap Diplomacy 56
Conclusion 71

Part III: Evidence That Honesty Matters 73

Chapter 4: Reputations for Honesty and the Success of Diplomacy 75
Central Empirical Implications of the Formal Model 77
Determining Empirical Implications of the Theoretical Model 78
Data and Methodology 81
The Escalation of International Disputes:Tests of the Theory 93
Robustness of the Empirical Results 99
Conclusion 109
Chapter 5: The Broader Importance of Reputations for Honesty 111
The Effect of the Defender's Reputation on States' Decisions to Begin Militarized Disputes and to Attempt Deterrence 112
The Role of the Military Balance 114
Conclusion 118

Part IV: Conclusion 121

Chapter 6: Conclusion 123

Part V: Appendixes 129

Appendix A: Characterization of the Equilibrium 131
Factorization 136
Choosing Thresholds So That Each Player-Type Prefers Its Equilibrium Strategy to Other Strategies Played in Equilibrium 139
Checking That No Player Prefers to Deviate to a Strategy No Type Plays in Equilibrium 141
No Player Prefers to Deviate at a Node Other Than the Player's First Node in the Stage Game 145
Appendix B: The Impact of Communication on War and on Welfare 146
Appendix C: Implications of the Theory 149
Appendix D: The E ffects of Power Status, Contiguity, and Democracy 151

Bibliography 153
Index 161