Competition Policy and Price Fixing (ebook)

Argumento de Competition Policy and Price Fixing (ebook)

"Kaplow has produced what is likely to be recognized as the definitive work on price fixing. His analysis is rigorous, comprehensive, lucid, and convincing."--Richard A. Posner, University of Chicago Law School

"Kaplow challenges--with gusto--the very foundations of existing price fixing doctrine. Read this book with an open mind and you will come away questioning basic concepts long taken for granted in antitrust law. Kaplow's analysis is precise and devastating. Prepare to be challenged and rewarded by this brilliant and radical book."--Carl Shapiro, University of California, Berkeley

"This is an ambitious book by a renowned scholar of antitrust law and economics on one of the most important and difficult topics in antitrust. Professor Kaplow demonstrates that current antitrust law for price fixing is fundamentally flawed and provides a fascinating road map for a new approach."--Richard J. Gilbert, professor emeritus, University of California, Berkeley

"This is the most significant book on the law and economics of collusion since Richard Posner's 1976 classic, Antitrust Law. Kaplow offers a well-conceived framework for examining the welfare impact of a price fixing regime and then uses it to produce many important insights. This provocative book will prove invaluable to scholars in economics and the law who work in the area of antitrust/competition policy. It is a must-read."--Joseph E. Harrington, University of Pennsylvania

"I highly recommend [Kaplow’s book] to economists and lawyers, as well as those working in competition policy issues than those in charge of its implementation."--David Encaoua, Journal of Economics

"[V]ery well documented. . . . I highly recommend to economists and lawyers, as well as those working in competition policy issues than those in charge of its implementation."--David Encaoua, Journal of Economics

"[H]is contribution to the debate is novel, provocative, and important."--Choice0Preface xiii
1. Introduction 1
PART I: HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS
2. Defining the Problem 21
3. Communications 50
4. Statutory Provisions and Higher Court Interpretations 69
5. U.S. Lower Court Practice 101
6. Paradox of Proof 125
7. Oligopoly Theory and the Agreement Requirement 174
PART II: PRICE-FIXING POLICY
8. Social Welfare 217
9. Framework for Decision-Making 231
10. Detection: Market-Based Evidence 256
11. Detection: Other Types of Evidence 286
12. Liability Assessment 307
13. Sanctions 322
14. Unilateral Market Power 346
15. Additional Considerations 368
PART III: COMPARISON OF APPROACHES
16. Communications-Based Prohibition 387
17. Detection of Prohibited Communications 398
18. Further Topics 420
19. Conclusion 443
References 455
Index 475