A Prosentential Theory of Truth (ebook)

Argumento de A Prosentential Theory of Truth (ebook)

In a number of influential articles published since 1972, Dorothy Grover has developed the prosentential theory of truth. Brought together and published with a new introduction, these essays are even more impressive as a group than they were as single contributions to philosophy and linguistics. Denying that truth has an explanatory role, the prosentential theory does not address traditional truth issues like belief, meaning, and justification. Instead, it focuses on the grammatical role of the truth predicate and asserts that "it is true" is a prosentence, functioning much as a pronoun does. Grover defends the theory by indicating how it can handle notorious paradoxes like the Liar, as well as by analyzing some English truth-usages. The introduction to the volume surveys traditional theories of truth, including correspondence, pragmatic, and coherence theories. It discusses the essays to come and, finally, considers the implications of the prosentential theory for other theories. Despite the fact that the prosentential theory dismisses the "nature of truth" as a red herring, Grover shows that there are important aspects of traditional truth theories that prosentential theorists have the option of endorsing.

Originally published in 1992.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.0Preface 1 Introductory Essay 3 1. On "the Nature of Truth" 4 2 The Prosentential Theory - Review and Reflections 15 3 Implications for Some Other Theories of Truth 27 4 Final Reflections 44 2 Propositional Quantifiers 46 A Preview 46 1 Introduction 47 2 A Language in Which Sentences Are the Substituends of Propositional Variables 48 3 A Language in Which Propositional Terms Are the Substituends of Propositional Term Variables 63 4 Summary 68 3 A Prosentential Theory of Truth 70 1 Ramsey 71 2 Prosentential Theory: Exposition 80 3 Prosentential Theory: Objections 97 4 Consequences and Applications 105 4 Inheritors and Paradox 121 1 Grounded Pronouns 124 2 Inheritors 125 3 Ungrounded Inheritors 126 4 Grounded Prosentences 127 5 Sentential Inheritors 127 6 Ungrounded Inheritors 128 7 Paradoxes 129 8 Generalized Versions of the Liar 129 9 Grounded/Ungrounded 131 10 A Cause of "Paradox" 132 11 A Strengthened Version of the Liar 133 12 Semantic and Logical Paradoxes 136 5 Prosentences and Propositional Quantification: A Response to Zimmerman 137 1 Prosentences 138 2 Propositional Quantification 140 3 Irredundant Uses of 'True' 143 6 Truth 146 1 Two Sources of Scepticism 152 2 Extensions for 'True' and 'False' 155 3 Would a Property-Ascribing 'True' Be Useful? 156 4 Review 164 5 Propositional Quantification in English 167 7 Truth: Do We Need It? 173 1 Problems of Expressibility 174 2 Is Truth a Property? 175 3 The Prosentential Theory 178 4 A Bit of Characterizing 181 5 Meaning and Truth 185 6 Logic and Truth 189 7 On 'Neither True nor False' 193 8 Properties Reconsidered 204 8 Berry's Paradox 207 1 Inheritors 208 2 Berry's Paradox 211 3 Variations on Berry 213 9 On Two Deflationary Truth Theories 215 A Preview 216 1 The Disquotational Theory 216 2 The Prosentential Theory 218 3 Generalization - A Comparison 222 4 Metalinguistic Uses of the Truth Predicate 225 5 Disquotation with Prosentences 230 6 Summary 233 10 Propositional Quantification and Quotation Contexts 234 1 Introduction 234 2 Grammar 235 3 Hierarchies 236 4 Semantics 238 5 Discussion 242 11 Quantifying in and out of Quotes 244 1 Logic as an Organon 244 2 0[subscript 2] and M[subscript 2] Completely Separate 249 3 0[subscript 3] a Proper Part of M[subscript 3] 260 4 0[subscript]4 and M[subscript 4] Overlap 275 Bibliography 277 Index 285