A New Stoicism (ebook)

Argumento de A New Stoicism (ebook)

What would stoic ethics be like today if stoicism had survived as a systematic approach to ethical theory, if it had coped successfully with the challenges of modern philosophy and experimental science? A New Stoicism proposes an answer to that question, offered from within the stoic tradition but without the metaphysical and psychological assumptions that modern philosophy and science have abandoned. Lawrence Becker argues that a secular version of the stoic ethical project, based on contemporary cosmology and developmental psychology, provides the basis for a sophisticated form of ethical naturalism, in which virtually all the hard doctrines of the ancient Stoics can be clearly restated and defended.

Becker argues, in keeping with the ancients, that virtue is one thing, not many; that it, and not happiness, is the proper end of all activity; that it alone is good, all other things being merely rank-ordered relative to each other for the sake of the good; and that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Moreover, he rejects the popular caricature of the stoic as a grave figure, emotionally detached and capable mainly of endurance, resignation, and coping with pain. To the contrary, he holds that while stoic sages are able to endure the extremes of human suffering, they do not have to sacrifice joy to have that ability, and he seeks to turn our attention from the familiar, therapeutic part of stoic moral training to a reconsideration of its theoretical foundations.

"A stimulating discussion of ethics that is free of the jejune or overly technical attitudes characteristic of much current writing on the subject."--Joseph Shea, n.b.: new from The Reader's Catalog

"From the beginning to the end of this compact but lucid book, Becker skillfully brings to life both the arguments and the intuitive appeal of stoicism.... In its essentials [the new stoicism] is recognizable, with its particularly astringent rational charm enhanced by Becker's focused and self-disciplined argumentation. Zeno, I suspect, would be pleased."--Brad Inwood, Apeiron0Acknowledgments ix
PART ONE: THE WAY THINGS STAND 1
1. The Conceit 3
2. A New Agenda for Stoic Ethics 5
3. The Ruins of Doctrine 8
Science, Logic, and Ethics 8
Norms and Moral Training 14
Virtue and Happiness 20
Commentary 22
Acknowledgments 30
PART TWO: THE WAY THINGS MIGHT GO 33
4. Normative Logic 35
Norms and Normative Propositions 36
Normative Constructs 39
Axioms of Stoic Normative Logic 42
5. Following the Facts 43
Impossibilities 44
A Posteriori Normative Propositions 46
Motivated Norms 52
Heteronomous Endeavors, Autonomous Agency, and Freedom 59
Commentary 69
Acknowledgments 80
6. Virtue 81
The Development of Virtue as the Perfection of Agency 81
THE STRUCTURE OF AGENCY 82
AGENCY CONSTRUCTED AND PERFECTED 103
VIRTUE AS IDEAL AGENCY 112
The Argument for Virtue as the Perfection of Agency 114
Exalted Virtue 119
Commentary 123
Acknowledgments 137
7. Happiness 138
A Complete Life 138
A Controlled Life 142
Life on the Rack 146
Joy 148
Commentary 150
Acknowledgments 158
Appendix
A Calculus for Normative Logic 159
Notation and Interpretation 159
Basic Definitions, Rules, and Axioms 163
Normative Constructs 167
Axioms of Stoic Normative Logic 181
Immediate Inferences 182
Commentary 185
Acknowledgments 191
Bibliography 193
Index 201